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the Private Sector 
David Heaney
MAXIMUS, Inc.
The implementation of WIA fostered the development of a wide 
range of solutions to address the problems of unemployment and/or un-
deremployment among selected demographic groups including youth, 
adults, dislocated (redundant) workers, the disabled, older adults, veter-
ans, and, in some cases, those families receiving public assistance under 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Many 
of the employment programs operating through One-Stop Career Cen-
ters have enjoyed considerable success. Their success, at least in part, 
appears owing to operational designs based on certain foundational 
principles set out in WIA. The principles place a high premium on 
employer-driven strategies and integrated service delivery through co-
locating key providers under one roof. The act envisioned a nationwide 
network of One-Stop Career Centers where job seekers and employers 
could access all required resources in a single location. A key feature of 
successful programs has been their capacity to effectively leverage the 
strengths of this diverse set of partner organizations operating side by 
side. Still, while many achieved impressive outcomes under this design, 
many others found the new model unwieldy, diffi cult to manage, and 
driven by a disproportionate focus on business. 
The foundational principles embodied in the legislation are intend-
ed to be institutionalized in the overall design of all program operations. 
A key differentiator between WIA and its predecessors is the role that 
business is intended to play in both the creation and ongoing man-
agement of the One-Stop delivery system. The One-Stop system was 
intended to be and is often described as “employer driven.” Employ-
ers, it is reasoned, understand a community’s existing and emerging 
labor market conditions, occupational needs, and skill sets required 
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for in-demand jobs. The employer is, after all, the consumer who hires 
well-equipped job seekers. Employer need should, therefore, defi ne 
and determine the content of education and training programs to pre-
pare and equip the workforce. By designing a system around employer 
needs, WIA intended to create a business-friendly system. 
Under the current operating model, the management of One-Stop 
centers may be competitively procured, which has spawned the growth 
of a new, albeit small, industry of One-Stop operators. These manage-
ment entities are responsible for organizing and managing 12 mandated 
and colocated partners, together with various voluntary partners into a 
seamless employment service system, which will meet specifi c perfor-
mance levels established by the Workforce Investment Board (WIB). 
Managing entities come from the private for-profi t, nonprofi t, and 
public sectors. After some 10 years, the number of private, for-profi t 
companies competing for One-Stop management opportunities has no-
ticeably dwindled to a relatively small group. Managing entities, for 
the most part, appear to remain the same from procurement to procure-
ment. The reasons for this vary and will be discussed in this chapter. 
However, the impact of this withdrawal has limited competition, and 
perhaps innovative and more effective approaches to achieving better 
employment outcomes in more effi cient and cost-effective ways. 
The impact of minimal competition on service delivery arguably 
encourages maintenance of the status quo and stimulates little in the 
way of novel approaches. I personally have spoken with executives 
from some of the nation’s largest WIBs, who express concern about the 
diminishing number of qualifi ed bidders competing in their procure-
ments. Some critics of the workforce investment system have called for 
the elimination of competitive procurements altogether as a means to 
acquire workforce services. 
The discussion presented in this chapter assumes that open and fair 
competition between a diverse set of qualifi ed bidders supports con-
tinuous improvement, high performance, and increased transparency. 
Whether limited participation by the private sector has, in fact, inhibited 
the creation of more effective programs cannot be established without 
careful evaluation of empirical data. Overall, this paper aims to encour-
age the development of policies which facilitate procurement processes 
and operational models designed to attract a greater number and more 
diverse set of qualifi ed bidders from all sectors. With this in mind, I 
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have attempted to identify some of the factors contributing to the pri-
vate sector’s ambivalence toward the WIA market in the United States. 
The aim here is to identify several signifi cant practices that discour-
age private sector participation in procurements to manage One-Stop 
centers and to briefl y comment on what this has meant to the industry. 
Finally, I will discuss alternative approaches which WIA reauthoriza-
tion will need to address to support the engagement and retention of a 
diverse network of providers. 
The perspective offered here is one derived principally from ob-
servation of many existing WIA-funded One-Stop operations, as well 
as discussions with a wide range of leaders from the fi eld over the past 
decade. The perspective I bring is that of an executive from a large for-
profi t organization that views the current WIA market as one fraught 
with risk, and in this regard, not viable from a business perspective. 
Therefore, I have identifi ed selected changes to the current WIA system 
that could increase market desirability, support increased achievement 
of performance outcomes, and promote greater efforts to economize 
through effi ciency. 
PRIVATE SECTOR, THIRD SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR:
THE CHALLENGE OF STEREOTYPES 
Right or wrong, there exists in every community a tension between 
business and government. Generally, business wants as little gov-
ernment interference in its affairs as possible. “Why would I go to a 
government agency for help with my business when their interference 
always makes my life more diffi cult?” one business owner asked in a 
discussion regarding WIA employer services. Again, right or wrong, 
third-sector (non profi t) organizations are commonly perceived as indif-
ferent to the “bottom line” and more focused on job seeker services than 
employer hiring needs. And fi nally, the private, for-profi t sector is often 
viewed as indifferent to everything but the bottom line. 
The overall aim of keeping the private sector engaged is to sup-
port competition that improves quality of service while creating greater 
economies and effi ciencies for the government and taxpayer. The same, 
of course, might be argued in favor of retaining third-sector, organized 
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labor, and public sector approaches—all of which bring unique solu-
tions that offer varying degrees of value. Setting aside stereotypes and 
promoting policies that encourage a diverse pool of bidders supports 
the government’s goal of obtaining “best value.” 
WHO DRIVES THE SYSTEM? 
Under WIA, emphasis has been directed toward creating and oper-
ating an employer-driven system. The thinking is based on the notion 
that business leaders best understand the unique emerging labor market 
needs of the communities in which they operate. Many WIBs appear 
to have been unclear, or had only a vague sense of what “employer 
driven” meant and the changes it was intended to facilitate that dif-
ferentiated WIA from its predecessor, the Job Training Partnership Act 
(JTPA). Following the passage of WIA, some WIBs actively engaged 
employers to help reshape their service delivery models, while others 
argued that greater emphasis should be placed on job seeker needs. 
A broad look at the changes in the workforce delivery system sug-
gests that relatively few WIBs have truly created an employer-driven 
service delivery system, instead doing what long-time providers have 
frequently done—build a service-rich environment to meet job seeker 
desires even when these are at odds with the realities of the existing 
market. A recent conversation with the labor commissioner from a Mid-
west state illustrated the challenge of supporting an employer-driven 
system. She explained that WIA’s promotion of customer choice as a 
guiding principle has unintentionally created an opportunity for un-
necessarily expensive training providers to exploit job seeker interests 
while turning a blind eye to employer hiring needs. Job seekers are en-
couraged to assert their right to choose, too often selecting trainers with 
the best television commercial but poor employment placement rates. 
Visits to scores of major One-Stops further illustrate this point; 
while job seeker resource centers appear consistently active, many 
newly created Employer Services Business Centers, designed to serve 
employers, remain underutilized. It is true that some employers have 
taken advantage of One-Stop hiring assistance, but it is also true that 
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many WIA industry observers worry that such employers often offer 
unsustainable employment.
Striking a balance between employer- and job-seeker-focused ser-
vice delivery models seems obvious but has proven diffi cult to achieve. 
Such a balance requires the right mix of stakeholder partners engaged in 
service delivery. To be useful to a broader range of employers, the One-
Stop Employer Services function may require a level of sophistication 
on par with services provided by human resources, outplacement, staff-
ing, and consulting fi rms. This perhaps means better resourcing and 
signifi cantly greater efforts to reach the large number of employers 
who do not use and indeed remain unaware of the services and benefi ts 
offered by the nation’s One-Stop Career Center network. Policies to sup-
port business participation, such as requiring the board to be weighted 
in favor of business leadership, have done relatively little to promote 
greater interest in the One-Stops’ capacity to help build and effectively 
serve their labor force. 
As it stands, to portray the current workforce system as employer 
driven appears inaccurate. WIA policy needs to underscore the inter-
dependent relationship between employer and job seeker. While WIA 
policy should clearly refl ect a commitment to both job seeker and em-
ployer interests, to meet the needs of both groups, it too should facilitate 
the creation of service models to capture the interests of a wider range 
of providers who possess the appropriate expertise to meet the needs of 
the community’s business leadership. 
FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS: ADMINISTRATIVE
AND PROFIT CAPS 
The inclusion of private for-profi ts in the management of any 
public program inevitably raises concerns about whether profi t is ap-
propriate when using public monies and, if it is, what constitutes a fair 
and reasonable profi t. The ambivalence felt by many WIBs is expressed 
in policies that include profi t caps, holdbacks, administrative caps, and 
disproportionate risk and reward ratios. 
Administrative costs are typically capped at what are often per-
ceived to be unrealistic levels, forcing many organizations to broaden 
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the interpretation of what can be classifi ed as a program cost. In some 
ways related to stereotyping, local policy restrictions placed on a One-Stop 
operator’s ability to earn profi t and the imposition of administrative 
caps refl ect a fundamental and pervasive ambivalence regarding the 
private sector’s role in the workforce delivery system. On the one hand, 
WIA legislation was intended to engage the private sector in a leader-
ship role, mandating that the majority of WIB members be from the 
private sector. On the other hand, policies that cap both profi t and ad-
ministrative costs can, and do, discourage private sector interest in WIA 
opportunities. 
Caps on profi t and administrative costs are intended to protect the 
public’s interest by requiring contractors to allocate a specifi ed per-
centage of the total contract value to direct service. However, when 
profi t rules are viewed within the context of the growing demand for 
outcome-based, pay-for-performance contracting, risk and reward are 
generally disproportionate. In other words, if profi t is capped at 6–8 
percent (which it commonly is) and is contingent upon meeting all per-
formance targets, then failure to meet targets should, too, be capped at 
6–8 percent, instead of not compensating a provider at all. 
Alternatively, if the contracting agency is concerned with not sim-
ply achieving but exceeding specifi c outcomes, creating a much broader 
upside-downside spread is likely to drive greater innovation and better 
outcomes. There is no reason to believe that highly prescriptive rules 
regarding administrative and profi t limits have led to better outcomes. 
Instead, such restrictions may have limited competition and squelched 
innovative approaches by shrinking the pool of potential providers. 
Unrealistically low administrative caps force bidders to “back into” 
their solutions. Instead of allocating time and necessary resources based 
on the best solution to meet contract targets, solutions must be tailored 
to conform to the required allocation formula. Artifi cial allocation for-
mulas result in decreased transparency and accountability. 
It also seems appropriate to ask what end is actually served by im-
posing caps. When an organization purchases, say, computer hardware 
through a competitive procurement, “best value” is generally tied to 
some combination of best product and best price. A government agency 
does not make a decision to buy 100 personal computers on the basis of 
administrative costs and profi t margins associated with the production 
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of those 100 PCs. Rather, the decision is based on the quality of the 
product, available funding, and the price. 
If performance measures are carefully constructed, risk and profi t 
limits can both be more expansive. Allowing bidding organizations to 
design and price their proposals based on their risk/reward tolerance 
levels should be explored. Such freedom creates a more diverse col-
lection of bidders. At one end of the spectrum are entrepreneurs and 
risk takers whose solutions are designed to exceed targets, and at the 
other are those whose tolerance for risk is low but whose performance 
is deemed adequate to meet performance targets. 
WIA rules might better refl ect a commitment to both business and 
job seeker by seeking providers who will raise the bar for performance, 
quality, economy, and effi ciency. The good news is these improvements 
can be accomplished without additional funds, but simply with fewer 
prescriptive accounting rules. Transparency and accountability are not 
compromised when actual administrative costs are reported, and profi t 
earned is a consequence of performance against targets. 
GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 
The diverse array of WIA partners creates signifi cant challenges. 
The composition of the local WIBs requires participation by represen-
tatives from a wide range of stakeholder groups, including business, 
labor, education, economic development, each of the One-Stops, and 
community-based organizations. At least 51 percent of the board must 
be comprised of representatives from the business community. Addi-
tionally, the board chair must be from the business community. There 
are, of course, trade-offs inherent in such broad representation. Pre-
dictably, the ability to make decisions on urgent matters is frequently 
achieved through consensus and compromises that ultimately please no 
one. Critics complain WIA representation requirements create an un-
necessarily large, unwieldy, and ineffective board. The ideal of broad 
representation, collaborative program design, and consensus-driven 
leadership has created still more unintended consequences that impact 
participation, especially among those who derive no clear return on 
148   Heaney
their investment of time and energy. This is particularly important at the 
local level where local board decisions directly impact service delivery. 
The managing entity responsible for day-to-day oversight of the 
local One-Stop Career Center struggles with the same challenges posed 
by the broad participation requirements at the WIB level. The require-
ment for colocation of different agencies and organizations serving the 
same customer is intended to promote better service through easy ac-
cess to services. However, both strategic and day-to-day operational 
management is a complicated affair where building consensus among 
mandated partners can make even relatively simple organizational deci-
sions diffi cult. Without clear lines of authority, especially as they relate 
to uniform standards for quality, customer service, and performance 
management, the managing partner absorbs all risk without a defi ned 
path for mitigation. This is a particular challenge to for-profi ts where 
some portion of total revenue may be tied to the achievement of targets. 
The degree to which One-Stop partners organize around common 
goals with a clear management structure directly impacts the capacity to 
generate revenue. Still, disparity in compensation schemes, work hours, 
and organizational cultures cannot all be resolved by institutionalizing 
the managing partner’s authority. Generally, because risks and rewards 
tied to revenue cannot be fl owed down to all partner organizations, the 
managing partner, whose earnings and profi ts are tied to performance, 
bears the brunt of responsibility. Failure or success regarding target 
achievement simply does not drive performance with the same degree 
of urgency as when targets are tied to revenues. The policy challenge 
here is daunting. How, or should, policy align the interests of all par-
ticipating partner organizations so that risks and rewards are genuinely 
shared? How, for example, can incentive and bonus programs, generally 
an integral component of successful for-profi t approaches, be equitably 
implemented across multiple organizations providing integrated ser-
vices under one roof? How does a One-Stop offer extended hours (often 
a contractual requirement) when labor contracts and organizational pol-
icies make it diffi cult, if not impossible, to meet this obligation? 
While current policy has created challenges for both WIBs and 
comprehensive One-Stops, failure to preserve broad representation at 
the state, local, and One-Stop levels would be regressive and coun-
terproductive. Clarifi cation of the One-Stop managing entity’s role as 
managing partner with authority to make decisions regarding perfor-
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mance, quality, and corrective actions would facilitate the development 
of a more seamless service delivery model as was envisioned by the 
WIA legislation. Additionally, identifi cation of best practices regarding 
effective governance and management models, including targeted tech-
nical assistance for new managing partners, will help generalize more 
successful approaches. 
PROGRAM SEQUENCE 
Rules that leave the provider with little discretionary authority un-
dermine creative engagement of both job seekers and employers. The 
WIA requirement of sequencing movement through the “core, inten-
sive, individual training account” tiers frustrates all parties who may 
clearly discern a path that leads to a desired outcome. Policies that offer 
providers greater discretionary authority regarding the level of service 
appropriate to an individual customer will improve the pace of reem-
ployment by allowing direct service providers to route customers in a 
timely fashion to the best resource(s) available. Limitations on discre-
tion and the corresponding development of prescriptive procedure is 
designed to ensure that services are fairly, equitably, and consistently 
provided. If the provider and the customer’s interests are aligned, allow-
ing greater levels of discretion supports seeking the most direct route 
to most favorable outcome. Limitations on discretion in favor of highly 
prescribed program sequences are generally most critical when a pro-
vider is able to achieve some benefi t by acting in a manner not in accord 
with the customer’s best interest. As long as both parties’ interests are 
aligned, allowing greater discretionary authority encourages providers 
to redesign cumbersome business processes to offer improved customer 
service and capture greater effi ciencies and cost savings. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Performance measures are designed to refl ect whether a job seeker 
has succeeded in upgrading skills, securing employment, retaining a 
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job, and progressing satisfactorily along a determined career track. 
Many critics have described these performance measures as burden-
some, arguing they should be streamlined. From the perspective of 
managing operations, timely availability of performance data is most 
critical. Major gaps between a key event and the provider’s ability to 
track that event have dramatic performance implications. The stakes 
are still greater where provider payments are tied to measures that are 
reported months after the fact. When a provider is unable to obtain in-
formation required to manage the achievement of successful outcomes 
tied to payment, the program is fatally fl awed. Reexamining the model 
to determine where the fi x must be applied needs to be embodied in pol-
icy change, the performance measure, how the data element is captured, 
who captures the data element, or the means for reporting critical data. 
An equally formidable challenge pertains to vaguely defi ned rules 
that apply to program enrollment. Provider performance is measured 
against those whom the provider enters into the performance denomina-
tor. It is well-known that the “gatekeeper” role played by the One-Stop 
managing entity is essential to meeting targets. Program designs that 
keep those with more complex needs out of the denominator undermine 
the overall purpose of the One-Stop. On the other hand, an employer 
driven approach is clearly at odds with enrolling ill-equipped job seekers. 
Performance measures need to refl ect enrollment in distinct service-
level tracks. Additionally, policies should establish standardized assess-
ment tools designed to help determine the most appropriate service-
level track for job seeker customers. The Australian Department of 
Education, Employment, and Workplace Relations, which administers 
similar employment programs, has devised such a tool and deployed 
it nationwide. The level of service is determined by an independently 
administered assessment. Providers are paid according to a payment 
schedule designed to refl ect the level of effort. An appeals process 
allows the provider to present evidence to demonstrate that the initial 
level of service determination may have been inadequate. The adoption 
of a similar approach would both support better service and offer more 
useful data. It also may help better defi ne the role of certain upfront 
services as distinct and independent from postenrollment activities. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foundational principles upon which the workforce delivery 
system in the United States is built are sound, but large-scale efforts 
to operationalize them are fl awed. There is a signifi cant disconnect be-
tween the aim of creating a business-driven One-Stop system and a 
procurement process and service delivery model that creates an envi-
ronment in which it is diffi cult to be even marginally successful. Subtle 
prejudices are played out in ways that inhibit a more successful inte-
gration of mandated and voluntary partners. Fiscal rules and practices 
frustrate participation by for-profi ts and perpetuate the problems cre-
ated by a limited pool of qualifi ed bidders. Governance, management, 
and operations in general are heavily prescriptive and at odds with the 
common practice adopted by most government agencies over the past 
decade of paying for performance and tying profi t to target achieve-
ments. Having said that, pay for performance schemes should be linked 
to outcomes only where operators have the fl exibility to refi ne existing 
approaches as they go and change out those that simply do not work in 
favor of more effective practices. Performance measures need to take 
account of the entire population requiring service and provide meaning-
ful information for continuous improvement. 
While there exist many challenges to keeping the private sector en-
gaged in ongoing One-Stop center management procurements, a major 
redesign would be signifi cantly less productive than relatively minor 
changes to existing program rules. WIA included language requiring 
a comprehensive evaluation by 2005. Regrettably, this did not happen. 
The result is that relatively little information exists on what employment 
and training services really work and for whom. Reauthorization of 
WIA, therefore, should proceed with some degree of caution. Proposals 
that call for dismantling or radically redesigning the workforce delivery 
system without such an evaluation appear reckless and confl ict with 
the current administration’s promotion of evidence-based practices. 
Rather, continuous improvement practices (a concept that lies at the 
heart of WIA approaches) suggest the opportunity still exists to review 
the evidence we have, to highlight best (and worst) practices, to create 
additional forums such as this conference for the exchange of ideas, and 
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to make an intentional effort to reengage the business community at all 
levels through easily improved policies derived from the right princi-
ples that support the evolution of a stronger workforce delivery system. 
